Cooperative or Controlling? The Effects of CEO-board Relations and the Content of Interlocks on the Formation of Joint Ventures

The order of authorship was determined alphabelicaily. We thank the associate editor Don Palmer, three anonymous reviewers, and The following individuals for their helpful comments: Gautam Ahuja, Martin Gargiulo, Mark Mizruchi, MarcDavid Seidel, Karen Westphai, and Edward Zajac. We would like to thank Linda Johanson for editorial guidance. This study examines the influence of the sociai network of board interlocks on strategic alliance formation. Our theoretical framework suggests how board interlock ties to other firms can increase or decrease the likelihood of alliance fornnatlon, depending on the content of relationships between CEOs (chief executive officers) and outside directors. Resuits suggest that CEO-board relationships characterized by independent board control reduce the likelihood of alliance formation by prompting distrust between corporate leaders, while CEO-board cooperation in strategic decision making appears to promote alliance formation by enhancing trust. The findings also show how the effects of direct interlock ties are amplified further by third-party network ties.*