Strategic analysis of influence peddling
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper analyzes Inuence Peddlingwith interaction between human capital transfer and collusion-building aspects in a model, in which each government o¢ cial regulates multiple rms simultaneously. We show that (i) there exists an optimal division rule for collusion between a sequence of quali edregulators and a rm; (ii) as the regulators increasingly bene t from the collusion, they strictly decrease regulation rates for the rm under collusion while strictly increasing regulation rates for a rm not under collusion; and (iii) post-government-employment restrictions are not e¤ective policies, and an alternative policy can be suggested. Keywords and Phrases: revolving doors, signaling games, repeated games JEL Classi cation Numbers: D73, H83, L51 We are grateful to Geir Asheim, Parimal K. Bag, Talia Bar, Kaushik Basu, Yeon-Koo Che, Ani Guerdjikova, Byoung Heon Jun, John Quah, Roland Strausz and Shmuel Zamir for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks are due to seminar participants at The Royal Economic Society Third PhD Presentation Meeting at UCL, The International Meeting for Public Economic Theory (PET 08), Cornell, Hanyang, Korea, NUS, Waseda, Yonsei University, KAIST, KIPF, KISDI and KDI for comments. Of course, all remaining errors are ours. yDepartment of Economics, Cornell University, 460 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA (e-mail: [email protected]). zDivision of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, 14 Nanyang Drive, Singapore 637332 (e-mail: [email protected]).
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 41 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012