Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Beliefs
نویسندگان
چکیده
In many laboratory experiments, different subjects in the same player role have different beliefs and play differently. To explore the impact of these heterogeneous beliefs, along with the idea that subjects use their information about other players’ payoffs, we define rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE). We provide several examples to highlight the impact of heterogeneous beliefs, and show how mixed strategies can correspond to heterogeneous play in a large population. We also show any heterogeneous-belief RPCE can be approximated by a RPCE in a model where every agent in a large pool is a separate player.
منابع مشابه
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others; We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE...
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