Electronic Companion — “ Efficiency of Scalar - Parameterized Mechanisms ” by Ramesh Johari and
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
We consider the problem of allocating a fixed amount of an infinitely divisible resource among multiple competing, fully rational users. We study the efficiency guarantees that are possible when we restrict to mechanisms that satisfy certain scalability constraints motivated by large scale communication networks; in particular, we restrict attention to mechanisms where users are restricted to o...
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