The Idea of Words as Signs

The aim of this paper is to question the almost universal assumption that words are signs. I first offer an interpretation of that assumption, which links it to the so-called thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign. I then draw out and explain one key commitment of the assumption, on that interpretation. This commitment of the view that words are signs appears to be open to an obvious objection, which I briefly explain. 1. What Everyone Assumes Almost everyone assumes that words are signs, although they often do so without noticing. Some hesitate a little before openly endorsing the assumption—either because they have a very particular understanding of what signs are, or because, once they are consider the assumption explicitly, they find they are not sure what signs are at all. But those who hesitate because they have a particular understanding of the notion of a sign are usually prepared to accept something a little looser or more contextualized, such as that languages (as wholes) are systems of signs; for my present purposes I will count such looser or more contextualized assumptions as just versions of the assumption that words are signs, and will take the assumption that words are signs itself as being to be understood in some suitably contextualized way. And those who hesitate because they find they are not sure what signs are, when they consider the issue explicitly, generally turn out to be committed to the same fundamental things as those who accept more easily that words are signs. When the assumption that words are signs is made, it is made very quickly, and then scarcely re-examined. It seems to be thought that it is just obviously true, rather as if it was a commonly observed empirical truth, similar in kind to the truth that human beings are made of flesh and blood. Because it seems just obviously true, this assumption is also thought not to be very important for any of the really interesting issues in the philosophy of language: it is as if it is not really part of the philosophy of language—or any kind of philosophy—at all.