Who Will Gain and Who Will Lose Influence under Different Electoral Rules . Who Will Gain and Who Will Lose Influence under Different Electoral Rules*

*The research reported here was supported by funds granted to the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin by the Office of Economic Opportunity pursuant to provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. We also acknowledge computation funds from NICHD grant l-P01-HD05876. The conclusions are the sale responsibility of the authors. ABSTRACT Elec~'oraJ,. reform has periodically been an issue of immense importance and so long as the potential for crisis remains this issue is certain to recur. What would constitute an electoral crisis is, foremost, an indecisive contest, and~ $ecoridarily, a failure by the electoral vote winner to also capture a plul;ality of the popular vote. A number of propo$als for electoral reform have been advanced', ranging from simple alterations of the present Electoral Col1el?iEi! system, to comprehensive reformations such as adopting a district plan, prqportionaldivision of the electoral vote, or direct popular election of the pre~ident. In this paper we investigate how the impact of various social groups on the outcome of, a, presidential contest would be altered under each of the reform'propos~la.' A simulation methodology is used, with base line data on group voting obtained from the 1960 contest between Kennedy and Nixon. Our results indicate that, in comparison with the popular vote, the Electoral College advantages the following population groups: large state residents, metropolit~n area residents, Negroes, Catholics, and possibly low income persons., The district and proportional plans, by generally disadvantaging th~se populations relative to the popular vote, would build a reverse bias into the ele9toral system.