Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg Phenomenon

نویسندگان

  • Horacio L. Arló-Costa
  • Jeffrey Helzner
چکیده

The “Ellsberg phenomenon” has played a significant role in research on imprecise probabilities. Fox and Tversky [7] have attempted to explain this phenomenon in terms of their “comparative ignorance” hypothesis. We challenge that explanation and suggest that our recent empirical work suggests an explanation that is much closer to Ellsberg’s own diagnosis.

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تاریخ انتشار 2005