Pragmatism, minimalism, and the space of reasons

In this paper I want to explore some lines of thought leading people in each of two directions. One is towards ‘inferential role’ semantics, and the other is towards minimalism in the theory of truth. At first sight these may seem to have little to do with each other, and little to do with the overt topic of this seminar, which is the theory of content. But among other things I want to show how the themes interweave. I am not, in fact, going to say much directly about inferential role semantics itself, for instance as it is developed in the work of Robert Brandom. But I shall say something about the Sellarsian roots of that movement, perhaps by way of excuse for sidestepping its later flowerings. My hope is that by the end of the paper I shall have done enough to deconstruct the imagery that motivates an opposition between inferential and referential or representational semantics.