A note on evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics.
نویسندگان
چکیده
In 1974 J. Maynard Smith introduced the fundamental notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in order to explain the evolution of genetically determined social behaviour within a single animal species. If the possible pure strategies for contests within a species are 1,2, . . ., ~1, and if A = (aij) is the payoff matrix, then aij is the payoff for the pure strategy i played against the pure strategy j; c aijqj is the payoff for the pure strategy i
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Journal of theoretical biology
دوره 81 3 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1979