Long-Run Analysis of the Stochastic Replicator Dynamics in the Presence of Random Jumps

Abstract A further generalization of the stochastic replicator dynamic derived by Fudenberg and Harris [12] is considered. In particular, a Poissonian integral is introduced to the fitness to simulate the affects of anomalous events. For the two strategy population, an estimation of the long run behavior of the dynamic is derived. For the population with many strategies, conditions for stability to pure strict Nash equilibria, extinction of dominated pure strategies, and recurrence in a neighborhood of an internal evolutionary stable strategy are derived. This extends the results given by Imhof [17]. Asymptotic stochastic stability; evolutionarily stable strategy; invariant measure; Lyapunov function; Nash equilibrium; recurrence; jump stochastic differential equation 92D15; 60H10; 60J40; 92D25