Arguing Away Suffering: The Neo-Cartesian Revival

Generally, people who have had the opportunity to observe nonhuman animals, especially vertebrates, for any length of time take for granted that these beings are conscious and capable of suffering. If we are pressed to give a rational defense of this belief, we can have no better start than the inductive argument from analogy to other minds from one's own case. Beings who are neurologically highly similar to me and who respond in complex, creative ways to stimuli that also elicit my responses are probably conscious just as I am. This is an extraordinarily strong inductive argument, fulfilling all criteria for good two-case analogical reasoning, licensing one to infer that another, be the other human or nonhuman, is not merely a cleverly contrived machine.! Those who are skeptical about induction as such are, of course, not persuaded by the argument, but they also cannot be persuaded about the existence of their own bodies, let alone anyone else's. Short of solipsism, one seems not to be irrational in putting one's confidence in the argument from analogy.