Germany’s Metaphysical War
نویسنده
چکیده
As is widely known, the onset of the First World War in 1914 produced a wide range of reactions from the intelligentsia of the countries at war, not only in Germany, but also, particularly, in France and England as well. Nevertheless, in Germany it was especially the philosophers who felt called upon to explain the meaning of the war in their own domain, i.e., philosophically. In this paper I will focus on the reaction of intellectuals in Germany, specifically the reaction of philosophers. There are many scholarly works that deal with the general public reaction to the outbreak of the war on the part of the intelligentsia, but less with those thinkers who professed particular “war philosophies.” Here I want to focus specifically on the publications of two important representatives of German philosophy, Max Scheler (1874-1928) and Paul Natorp (1854-1924), who made attempts at such a doctrine. As I will try to show, moreover, their “war philosophies” present two distinct but paradigmatic tendencies of explaining war in German philosophy, more generally of making war a philosophical issue. It is hence justified to juxtapose both thinkers in this common attempt. As ideological as these writings may be, I will attempt to judge them on philosophical grounds. Yet in the concluding part, I will discuss the question whether these “war philosophies” were truly ideologies, perhaps necessarily so.
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