CS 6840 : Algorithmic Game Theory Spring 2017 Lecture 23 : March 22
نویسنده
چکیده
For some auction, let v1...vn be bidder valuations for bidder i (potentially a vector of valuations, for multiitem auctions). Bidders bid some value bi, such that b = (b1, ...bn). Bidders seek to maximize some utility ui(b, vi), dependent on both the auction outcomes caused by other bids and their own valuation profile. For some distribution over bids N (where b can be sampled from N), this implies bidders seek to maximize Eb∼Nui(b, vi).
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تاریخ انتشار 2017