EMOTLAB: software for studying emotional signaling in economic bargaining games.

نویسندگان

  • Timothy Ketelaar
  • Ben Preston
  • Deborah Russell
  • Mark Davis
  • Garrett Strosser
چکیده

EMOTLAB software creates a virtual social environment in which individuals interact via computer with a virtual interaction partner in a series of economic bargaining games. The virtual partner appears on the participant's computer screen as a digital image (e.g., video or picture file) during each trial. A key feature of EMOTLAB software is its ability to control both the strategic behavior and the emotion signaling behavior (e.g., anger vs. embarrassment) of the virtual interaction partner. By simply editing a series of text files that control the subroutines governing the different features of the experiment (payoff structure, number of trials, etc.), EMOTLAB can generate an essentially infinite number of different social bargaining situations in which participants earn monetary payoffs contingent upon their decisions. This paper provides an overview of this software and how one can edit various subroutines to generate a typical experimental session in which research participants encounter a virtual interaction partner who displays different emotional signals.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Behavior research methods

دوره 39 4  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2007