Sensation , Introspection , and the Phenomenal Jonathan Ellis
نویسنده
چکیده
[This is a late but not final draft of my chapter in Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind, eds.
منابع مشابه
Introspection , intentionality and the transparency of experience
1. Introspection and phenomenal character How much can introspection tell us about the nature of perceptual experience? This partly depends on what we understand by ‘the nature of perceptual experience’. It is hardly to be expected that introspection could tell us, for example, whether our experiences are brain states, or supervene on brain states; this is something which must be decided on the...
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