Feedback Nash equilibria for linear quadratic descriptor differential games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon for descriptor systems of index one. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has a Nash equilibrium.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Automatica
دوره 48 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012