The effects of takeover threats on shareholders and firm value

نویسندگان

  • Marco A. Haan
  • Yohanes Riyanto
چکیده

We study the role of takeover threats as a corporate control mechanism using [Aghion, P., Tirole, J., 1997. Formal and real authority in organizations. Journal of Political Economy 105, 1–29] model of formal and real authority. Shareholders do not monitor the manager’s actions since ownership is widely dispersed. A corporate raider may monitor and step in if a profit opportunity exists. In our model, a takeover threat decreases managerial effort and may increase the value of the shares. We also look at the extent of anti-takeover defenses favored by individual shareholders and institutional investors. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G34; G35; G38

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Synergy Motivation and Target Ownership Structure: Effects on Takeover Performance

In this research, we find statistically significant positive abnormal returns around takeover announcements for combined firms. The cumulative average abnormal returns for combined firms are 4.62% over the event-window [-20, +20], which suggests that takeovers create shareholder wealth (synergy motive). In addition, we examine the impact of ownership structure in target firms on the abnormal re...

متن کامل

Takeover and Monitor under External Corporate Control

We study how both external corporate governance factors and internal corporate governance factors jointly affect the large shareholder’s takeover or monitor decision. The large shareholders monitor the management and have option to takeover the firm. External corporate governance forces impose stealing costs to the manager. In equilibrium, large shareholder’s takeover or monitoring decision, ta...

متن کامل

The Corporate Governance Role of Information Quality and Corporate Takeovers

This paper examines the corporate governance role of firms’ information quality and the takeover market in disciplining management. We consider a model where the takeover market plays a disciplinary role in replacing the inefficient incumbent manager to increase firm value. Increasing the information quality improves the takeover efficiency, but more precise information also discourages the man...

متن کامل

Mergers and Acquisitions: Strategic and Informational Issues

A merger is a transaction that combines two firms, leaving one surviving entity. An acquisition is the purchase of one firm by another individual or firm. Both transactions fall under the more general heading of takeovers. Takeovers can play a constructive economic role, for example by removing inefficient management or by achieving economies of scale and complementarity. On the other hand, the...

متن کامل

An Investigation into Effects of Dividend Policy on Financial Growth of Advertising Firms in Kenya

Effects of dividend policy on corporate financial growth, is a major concern of most entities. Whether dividends have an influence on the value of the firm, is an important question in dividend policy. This study aimed at investigating the effects of dividend policy on financial growth of media firms. The study was conducted in Nairobi at The Nation media Group Headquarters. Respondents were se...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2000