Appendix to Accompany: Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market
Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have each been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputationbuilding models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduc...
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متن کاملMultiple reputation domains and cooperative behaviour in two Latin American communities.
Reputations are a ubiquitous feature of human social life, and a large literature has been dedicated to explaining the relationship between prosocial reputations and cooperation in social dilemmas. However, humans form reputations in domains other than prosociality, such as economic competency that could affect cooperation. To date, no research has evaluated the relative effects of multiple rep...
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Smallholder farmers rely on labor exchange to generate agricultural work when cash is rare and credit unavailable. Reciprocal altruism, biased by genetic kinship, has been implicated as the mechanism responsible for labor exchange; however, few empirical tests confirm this proposition. Competitive altruism could be operating if people differ in ability and use this information as a criterion fo...
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تاریخ انتشار 2006