Time to Give Up the Dogmas of Attribution: An Alternative Theory of Behavior Explanation

Attribution research has held a prominent place in social psychology for 50 years, and the dominant theory of attribution has been the same for all this time. Unfortunately, this theory (a version of attribution as covariation detection) cannot account for people’s ordinary explanations of behavior. The goal here is to present a theory that can. The theory is grounded in the framework of folk concepts children and adults use to make sense of human behavior, a framework that was already anticipated by Fritz Heider. To introduce the theory, I first map out this folk-conceptual framework, provide evidence for its core elements, and develop the cognitive and social features of behavior explanations, with a focus on the unique properties of intentional action explanation. I then apply the theory to a core attributional phenomenon—actor– observer asymmetries in explanation—and chart two additional applications. In light of these results, I summarize the theoretical and empirical reasons to give up these three dogmas of attribution theory: that behaviors are like all other events, that explaining behavior is choosing between person and situation causes, and that such choices are driven by covariation detection.