̳Mirror Neurons,‘ Collective Objects and the Problem of Transmission: Reconsidering Stephen Turner‘s Critique of Practice Theory*

In this paper, I critically examine Stephen Turner‘s (1994) critique of practice theory in light of recent research in neuroscience focused on the discovery the ―mirror neuron system‖ in the pre-frontal motor cortex of humans and other primates. I argue that the strength of two of Turner‘s strongest objections against the sociological version of practice theory—what I refer to as the problem of transmission and the problem of sameness—is substantially undermined when we take into account the theoretical and empirical implications of recently systematized accounts of embodied learning and intersubjective action understanding inspired by research into the structure and function of the mirror neuron system. In addition, I show that the sociological practice theory framework outlined by Pierre Bourdieu in the Logic of Practice and other works is, in contrast to Turner‘s portrayal of a confused hodgepodge of logical errors and empirical impossibilities, largely consistent with the latest evidence from neurophysiology and as such fundamentally foreshadowed more recent conceptions of the cognitive and neural foundations of the perception, understanding and organization of the motor schemes productive of action in the world and constitutive of habitus. Also in line with these newer developments in neuroscience, the practice theoryinspired focus on the body as the central matrix generative of tacit understandings and analogical operations responsible for ―higher order‖ systems of classification emerges as the key to solving some of the thorniest problems in the theory of action: eliminating to need to resort to unwarranted ―collective object‖ explanations for the origins of shared presuppositional frameworks.