Persistence of Monopoly and Research Specialization
نویسنده
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Persistence of Monopoly, Innovation, and R&D Spillovers: Static versus Dynamic Analysis
We build a dynamic duopoly model that accounts for the empirical observation of monopoly persistence in the long run. More specifically, we analyze the conditions under which it is optimal for the market leader in an initially duopoly setup to undertake pre-emptive R&D investment, (“strategic predation” strategy) that eventually leads to exit of the follower firm. The follower is assumed to ben...
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تاریخ انتشار 2009