Robust Receipt-Free Election System with Ballot Secrecy and Verifiability

For most elections, receipt-freeness is important – voters are unable to prove to others on how they voted, in order to prevent vote-buying. Many existing receipt-free electronic voting systems are not practical enough as they require voters to participate in the tallying phase (i.e. do not satisfy the vote-and-go requirement), or have no mechanism for the voters to verify whether their votes have been counted (i.e. do not satisfy universal verifiability). We propose a new way of constructing vote-and-go election system without tamper-resistant hardware, or anonymous channel. Receipt-freeness is guaranteed even if there is only one voting authority (in a distributed setting) being honest. Regarding the correctness, voter alone has no chance to tamper with the validity of the final tally, while any misbehaving authority can be detected (and proven to the public) by the tallying center. Robustness can be achieved by fixing the corrupted vote in a verifiable manner. Ballot secrecy cannot be compromised even if all tallying authorities collude.