Slumbot NL: Solving Large Games with Counterfactual Regret Minimization Using Sampling and Distributed Processing
نویسنده
چکیده
Slumbot NL is a heads-up no-limit hold’em poker bot built with a distributed disk-based implementation of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR). Our implementation enables us to solve a large abstraction on commodity hardware in a cost-effective fashion. A variant of the Public Chance Sampling (PCS) version of CFR is employed which works particularly well with
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 2013