Verifiable Offers and the Relationship between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations*
نویسندگان
چکیده
We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions with verifiable multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds. Despite the two institutions seeming equivalence, we find that prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second-price auctions. The difference occurs because low-cost sellers in negotiations often submit initial offers below the second-lowest cost. We also compare the two institutions to previously studied first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations with non-verifiable offers. Second-price auctions yield the highest prices, followed in order by verifiable negotiations, non-verifiable negotiations and first-price auctions.
منابع مشابه
The Effect of Offer Verifiability on the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions to “verifiable” multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer it currently holds. We find that transaction prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second-price auctions, despite the two institutions’ seeming equivalence. The difference occurs because l...
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