Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
نویسندگان
چکیده
In order to study voting situations when voters can also abstain and the output can be only binary, i.e., either approval or rejection, a new extended model of voting rule was defined. Accordingly, indices of power, in particular Banzhaf's index, were considered. In this paper we argue that in this context a power index should be a pair of real numbers, since this better highlights the power of a voter in two different cases, i.e., her being crucial when switching from being in favor to abstain, and from abstain to be contrary. We also provide an axiomatization for both indices, and from this a characterization as well of the standard Banzhaf index (the sum of the former two) is obtained. Some examples are provided to show how the indices behave. Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index Josep Freixas∗ and Roberto Lucchetti†
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Annals OR
دوره 244 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016