Hardness results on the man-exchange stable marriage problem with short preference lists
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present two hardness results on the man-exchange stable marriage problem, one of which settles a recent conjecture of Irving on the complexity of determining whether a given instance of the stable marriage problem with short preference lists has a man-exchange stable matching. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
منابع مشابه
Stable matching problems with exchange restrictions
We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement for a stable matching, namely that there should not be two participants who would prefer to exchange partners. The problem is motivated by the experience of real-world medical matching schemes that use stable matchings, where cases have arisen in which two participants discovered that each of the...
متن کاملStable Marriage with Multi-Modal Preferences
We introduce a generalized version of the famous STABLE MARRIAGE problem, now based on multimodal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one “evaluation mode” (e.g., more than one criterion); thus, each agent is equipped with multiple preference lists, each ranking the counterparts in a possibly differen...
متن کاملInapproximability Results on Stable Marriage Problems
The stable marriage problem has received considerable attention both due to its practical applications as well as its mathematical structure. While the original problem has all participants rank all members of the opposite sex in a strict order of preference, two natural variations are to allow for incomplete preference lists and ties in the preferences. Both variations are polynomially solvabl...
متن کاملInapproximability of Stable Marriage Problems
The stable marriage problem has received considerable attention both due to its practical applications as well as its mathematical structure. While the original problem has all participants rank all members of the opposite sex in a strict order of preference, two natural variations are to allow for incomplete preference lists and ties in the preferences. Both variations are polynomially solvabl...
متن کاملLocal Search Approaches in Stable Matching Problems
The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools or, more generally, to any two-sided market. In the classical formulation, n men and n women express their preferences (via a strict total order) over the members of the other sex. Solving an SM problem means finding a stable marriag...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- Inf. Process. Lett.
دوره 101 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007