Intensional Concepts in Propositional Semantic Networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
An integrated statement is made concerning the semantic status of nodes in a propositional semantic network, claiming that such nodes represent only in-tensions. Within the network, the only reference to extensionality is via a mechanism to assert that two intensions have the same extension in some world. This framework is employed in three application problems to illustrate the nature of its solutions. The formalism used here utilizes only assertional information and no structural , or definitional, information. This restriction corresponds to many of the psychologically motivated network models. Some of the psychological implications of network processes called node merging and node splitting ore discussed. Additionally, it is pointed out that both our networks and the psychologically based networks are prone to memory confusions about knowing unless augmented by domain-specific inference processes, or by structural information.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Cognitive Science
دوره 6 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1982