FS IV 99 - 10 Collusion with Private and Aggregate Information
نویسنده
چکیده
Collusion with Private and Aggregate Information by Jim Y. Jin* This paper considers three linear asymmetric oligopoly models with (i) a representative consumer, (ii) horizontal differentiation and (iii) vertical differentiation. We show that firms could maximize the joint-profit only based on private and aggregate information. They can choose the “correct“ colluding prices without knowing the demand or profit function. The collusive outcome is a natural focal point despite firms are asymmetric. Collusion can be incentive compatible even though individual actions (prices) are not observed.
منابع مشابه
Collusion with Monitoring Based on Self-Reported Sales∗
Motivated by some recent cartels, this paper characterizes a stable collusive mechanism when firms’ prices and quantities are private information. An equilibrium is described in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers based on these reports. Even though a higher sales report requires a higher transfer by a firm, the threat of a price war when the aggregate sales report...
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تاریخ انتشار 1999