Reference Point Effects in Legislative Bargaining: Experimental Evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
Recent interest in reducing budget deficits raises questions regarding the impact on legislative bargaining of cuts versus increases in government spending. Using an experimental design where the outcomes are theoretically isomorphic results in significant differences in bargaining outcomes: There are longer delays in reaching agreement with cuts than with increases, along with which legislative types get their proposals passed. These results can be attributed to the change in agents’ reference point in conjunction with differential responses to gains versus losses.
منابع مشابه
The Effects of Increasing versus Decreasing Private Goods on Legislative Bargaining: Experimental Evidence
Recent interest in reducing budget deficits raises questions regarding the impact of cuts versus increases in private good allocations on legislative bargaining. We investigate this issue using an experimental design where the outcomes are theoretically isomorphic. Payoffs are similar between the two cases, but which type gets their proposals passed changes substantially. Both gains and losses ...
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