The single-crossing assumption simplifies the analysis of screening models as local incentive compatibility becomes sufficient for global incentive compatibility. If single crossing is violated, global incentive compatibility constraints have to be taken into account. This paper studies monotone solutions in a screening model that allows a one-time violation of single crossing. The results show...

Contracts often take the form of options: oil fields can be abandoned, planning permission may go unused, and acquired firms can be liquidated. We consider a seller who auctions a dynamic option among N agents. After the auction, the economy evolves and the winning bidder chooses both if and when to execute the option. The revenue-maximising auction consists of an up-front bid and a contingent ...

On the Optimality of a Minimum Wage: New Insights from Optimal Tax Theory We build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax. We consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment. Workers differ in productivity. The government does not o...

We study how to design an optimal government loan program for risky R&D projects with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the contract involves a high interest rate but nearly zero cofinancing by entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply observed schemes. selection and moral hazard, allowing two levels of effort entrepreneur, policy consists menu at most contracts, one self-financing...

This article considers the consequence of incomplete contracts that arise due to difficulties in precisely describing potentially relevant contingencies. Unlike much of the literature, this article concludes that the resulting incompleteness could often be immaterial with respect to economic efficiency. Indeed, attempts to “improve” matters by increasing the accuracy with which the courts deter...

The Journal of Economic Literature codes classification system (JEL) published by the American Association (AEA) is de facto standard for research literature in economics. JEL used to classify articles, dissertations, books, book reviews, and working papers EconLit, a database maintained AEA. Over time, it has evolved extended with over 850 subclasses. This paper reviews history development sys...

Many separable dynamic incentive problems have primal recursive formulations in which utility promises serve as state variables. We associate families of dual recursive problems with these by selectively dualizing constraints. We make transparent the connections between recursive primal and dual approaches, relate value iteration under each and give conditions for such value iteration to be con...

Thinking about contingencies, designing covenants and seeing through their implications is costly. Parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete. The paper develops a model of bounded rationality and examines its consequences for contractual design. It is argued that cognition is a natural source of adverse selection in contractual relationships, that contracts may be...

When real estate agent effort is unobservable, home sellers do not prefer the lowest possible commission rate because such a rate does not induce sufficient effort from agents. As a result, the optimal commission from the seller’s perspective exhibits downward rigidity, even if there is free entry. The analysis shows that downward rigidity will occur if and only if the quasi-fixed costs of sell...

A central issue in designing incentive contracts is the decision to reward agents’ input use versus outputs. The trade-off between risk and return innovation production can also lead agents with varying skill levels perform differentially under different contracts. We study this experimentally, observing verifying inputs outputs Indian maternity care. find that both contract types achieve compa...