I provide a micro-foundation for dynamically incomplete contracts that are renegotiated over time. The micro-foundation is based on showing that such contracts implement the optimal complete contract in a general dynamic model provided the players have “preference-for-robustness.” Preference-for-robustness is a way of modeling players perpetually having a fuzzy idea as time passes about events ...

The main motivation of this paper is to study the impact of the composition of creditors on the probability of default and the corresponding default risk premium on sovereign bonds, when there is debtor moral hazard. In the absence of any legal enforcement, relational contracts work only when there are creditors who have a repeated relationship with the borrower. We show that ownership structur...

This paper studies the e¤ect of social ties on governance. Social ties are per se neutral and merely act as incentive bridges that transmit incentives across individuals. Whether this improves or undermines governance depends on what incentives are transmitted. We demonstrate this in a delegated monitoring model where the supervisor is friends with the agent and cares about social recognition. ...

We develop an agency model of financial contracting. We derive long-term debt, a line of credit, and equity as optimal securities, capturing the debt coupon and maturity; the interest rate and limits on the credit line; inside versus outside equity; dividend policy; and capital structure dynamics. The optimal debt-equity ratio is history dependent, but debt and credit line terms are independent...

We prove the existence of comonotone Pareto optimal allocations when decision makers have probabilistic sophisticated variational preferences and thus representing criteria in the class of law invariant robust utilities. In contrast to previous studies, we show that optimal allocations exist also when decision makers have very different preferences, for example characterized by different domain...

Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn cre...

We study optimal contracting in team settings where agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts. Incentives are provided informally, using wasteful sanctions like guilt and shame, or slowed promotion. These features give rise to optimal contracts with underperform...

We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and principals benefiting from a real effort task in which the agents’ performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of...

We propose a new business cycle theory. Firms need to randomize over firing or keeping workers who have performed poorly in the past, in order to give them an ex-ante incentive to exert effort. Firms have an incentive to coordinate the outcome of their randomizations, as coordination allows them to load the firing probability on states of the world in which it is costlier for workers to become ...

We develop a structural model to investigate the effects of asymmetric beliefs and agency conflicts on dynamic principal–agent relationships. Optimism has a first-order effect on incentives, investments, and output, which could reconcile the private equity puzzle. Asymmetric beliefs cause optimal contracts to have features consistent with observed venture capital and research and development (R...