This paper investigates the Stackelberg equilibrium for pricing and ordering decisions in a multi-channel supply chain. We study a situation where a manufacturer is going to open a direct online channel in addition to n existing traditional retail channels. It is assumed that the manufacturer is the leader and the retailers are the followers. The situation has a hierarchical nature and...

We investigate how a supply chain, formed by a risk-neutral supplier and a riskaverse retailer, can be coordinated with a supply contract. We demonstrate that the standard wholesale, buy-back or revenue-sharing contracts do not coordinate such a channel. We propose a definition of coordination of the supply chain, and design an easy-to-implement risk-sharing contract that offers the desired dow...

The revenue management concept and techniques are applied to model the coordination of supply chain elements. The fundamental premise of this approach is synchronization of a group of business entities consist-ing of a manufacturer and multiple suppliers to achieve an optimal supply chain capacity plans. The output of the supply chain can be various products and thus it is measured in terms of ...

Screening contracts (or non-linear “menu of contracts”) are frequently used for aligning the incentives in supply chains with private information. In this context, it is assumed that all supply chain parties are strictly (expected) profit maximizing and, therefore, sensible to even arbitrarily small pay-off differences between contract alternatives. However, previous behavioral work on contract...

Consignment contracts have been widely employed in many industries. Under such contracts, items are sold at a retailer’s but the supplier retains the full ownership of the inventory until purchased by consumers; the supplier collects payment from the retailer based on actual units sold. We investigate how competition among retailers influences the supply chain decisions and profits under differ...

The objective of the paper is to study how wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts affect operations and marketing decisions in a supply chain under different dynamic informational structures. We suggest a differential game model of a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a single retailer that agree on the contract parameters at the outset of the game. The model includes key oper...

This study divides the sales cycle of fresh agricultural products into two stages according to the features of fresh agricultural products, establishes two pricing strategies according to its sales and through constructing an centralized-control model of supply chain under the constraints of revenue sharing contract and through analyzing different prices in the two stages, it summarizes the sal...

A reverse supply chain, as a post-consumption activity, aims at extracting value from products at end of their life cycle (Mafakher and Nasiri, Journal of Cleaner Production 59: 185–196, 2013). As well, company’s awareness is attracting increasing attention toward sustainable business practices. Open-innovation is a typical example of coordinative activity that a manufacturer should share a pro...

One of the main priorities of companies involved in supply chains is improving the quality of their products. However, as in other parts of supply chain management, decentralized decision-making in supply quality management is prevalent, which causes inefficiencies such as the well-known double marginalization phenomenon. Coordinating schemes, such as the revenue sharing contract, can contribut...