In practices, the supplier may simultaneously offer the customer: (1) a permissible delay in payments to attract new customers and increase sales, and (2) a cash discount to motivate faster payment and reduce credit expenses. Since all cash outflows related to inventory control that occur at different points of time have different values, we use the discount cash-flow (or DCF) approach to esta...

Quantity discounts are a useful mechanism for coordination. Here we investigate such discounts from the supplier’s perspective, both from a non-cooperative game-theoretical approach and a joint decision model. Taking into account the price elasticity of demand, this analysis aids a sole supplier in establishing an all-unit quantity discount policy in light of the buyer’s best reaction. The Stac...

This paper constructs an emergency quantity discount contract to explore the inherent law of coordinating supply chain with stochastic market demand and price risk-averse supplier. Meanwhile, conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) risk measure criterion is revised study influence supplier’s aversion attitude on coordination. The results show that supplier will cause bifurcation relevant factors in un...

In the traditional economic order quantity/economic production quantity model, most of the items considered are of perfect type. But this situation rarely takes place in practice. Thus, in this paper, an economic order quantity model with imperfectquality items is developed. 100% screening process is performed, and the items of imperfect quality are sold as a single batch. A proportionate ra...

We investigate how a quantity discount schedule can be used to influence stocking decisions and supply chain performance in single-period interactions between a supplier and buyer(s). In contrast to much of the work that has been done on single-period supply contracts, we assume that there are no interactions between the supplier and the buyer(s) after demand information is revealed. Furthermor...

In contrast to the existing literature on repeated games that assumes a Þxed discount factor, I study an environment in which it is more realistic to assume a ßuctuating discount factor. In a repeated oligopoly, as the interest rate changes, so too does the degree to which Þrms discount the future. I characterize the optimal tacit collusion equilibrium when the discount factor changes over time...