A Comparative Study of the “Ideal Observer” in Meta-ethics and the “Divine Command” Theory

The two theories of “ideal observer” and “divine command” are theories on constructionism and voluntarism. According to the ideal theory, ethical realities are defined based on the attitudes of the assumed ideal observers and the foundation of these theories is formed on negation of the independent ethical realities. Therefore, existence of independent and evident ethical realities based on which human reason could be revealed is repudiated and ethical reality is considered as acceptable / unacceptable things proposed by some ideal observers. For this reason, these observers do not have independent ethical virtues and they are not obliged to observe any ethical principles or values in their own ethical judgments. The theory of divine command includes various versions and the theory of ideal observer along with its meta-ethical principles is totally similar to some varieties of this theory. Meanwhile, equality of the nature of the ideal observer theories and divine command of Asharites is significant. It appears that the theory of ideal observer is the same as Asharites’ being unconditionally represented in relation to existence and lack of ideal observers in non-religious form. Describing and comparing these two theories, the paper intends to reveal the identical nature of the both theories.