We present a necessary and almost sufftcient condition for subgame perfect implementation of social choice correspondences. In societies with at least three individuals, any social choice correspondence which satisfies no veto power and our necessary Condition a is subgame perfect implementable. Thus Condition GL is analogous to monotonicity which, by Maskin’s celebrated characterization, is ne...

It has been shown previously that, for two-sided discrete markets of the kind exemplified by the “marriage problem,” no strategy-proof procedure for aggregating preferences into stable outcomes exists. Here it is shown that (Nash) equilibrium misrepresentation of preferences nevertheless results in a stable outcome in terms of the true preferences when the aggregation procedure yields the optim...

☆ We are grateful to Kaushik Basu, Patrick Bolton, Rocc Debraj Ray for useful discussions. We also thank two an pants at the May 2009 “Microfoundations of Developme the WIDER conference on Land Inequality and Conflict their comments and feedback. We thank the Internation nancial support under grant RA-2009-11-025. ⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 617 353 4392. E-mail address: [email protected] (D. ...

Of the Taiwanese participants, only one showed any significant speech rate effect (t = 1.88, p < .05 for the first vowel of the tokens; t =2.29, p < .025 for both vowels combined). One other showed no speech rate effects whatsoever, instead inconsistently devoicing some tokens, while the third did not devoice any vowels within the tokens, instead only devoicing a small number of sentence-final ...

Crystal Structures of two Imidazole Derivatives P. Ambalavanan a , K. Palani a , M. N. Ponnuswamyand a , R. A. Thirumuruhan a , H. S. Yathirajan b , B. Prabhuswamy b , C. R. Raju b , P. Nagaraja b & K. N. Mohana b a Department of Crystallography and Biophysics , Universityof Madras , Guindy Campus, Chennai, 600 025, India b Department of Studies in Chemistry , University of Mysore , Manasagango...