According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character experience is exhausted by experiential presentation ‘low-level’ properties such as (in case vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according Rich can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ natural kinds, artefactual causal relations, linguistic meanings, moral properties. An important dialectical tool in...

Active externalism (also known as the extended mind hypothesis) says that we use objects and situations in the world as external memory stores that we consult as needs dictate. This gives us economies of storage: We do not need to remember that Bill has blue eyes and wavy hair if we can acquire this information by looking at Bill. I argue for a corollary to this position, which I call 'internal...

The externalist is obliged to accompany claims about the ontology of meaning with a plausible epistemology of adequacy for empirical concepts. She must construct an epistemology of meaning to support her claims in the philosophy of mind. (Millikan 2005: 72) Introduction Ever since Hilary Putnam proclaimed that 'meanings ain't in the head', philosophers have worried about how it could be, if sem...

When proponents of cognitive externalism (CE) have turned to empirical studies in cognitive science to put the framework to use, they have typically referred to perception, memory or motor coordination. Not much has been said about reasoning. One promising avenue to explore here is the theory of bounded rationality (BR). In this paper, we try to clarify the potential relationship between these ...

It is argued that a subject's evidence consists of all and only the propositions that the subject knows. I Tradition has it that the main problems of philosophy include the nature of knowledge. But, in recent decades, questions of knowledge seem to have been marginalized by questions of justification. Thus, according to Crispin Wright, … knowledge is not really the proper central concern of epi...

Abstract: The computational metaphor for mind is still the central guiding idea in cognitive science despite many insightful and well-founded rejections of it. There is good reason for its staying power: when we are at our cognitive best, we reason about our world with our concepts. But the challengers are right, I argue, in insisting that no reductive account of that capacity is forthcoming. H...

Skinner ́s approach to a science of behavior is discussed with reference to the concept of “externalism” (the search for relations between the organism and external events). Skinner’s works, respectively, from 1938, 1953 and 1990, whose discourses deal with different explanations of behavior, are examined in order to emphasize his persistent concern with drawing a clear distinction between behav...

According to reliabilism, knowledge is basically true belief acquired through a reliable process. Many epistemologists have argued recently that reliabilism fails to accommodate our pre-systematic judgment that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. The paper pinpoints where this so-called swamping argument goes wrong. It is then argued that true beliefs that are reliably acquired ar...

1. McKinsey’s reductio argument: Externalism and self-knowledge In ‘Anti-individualism and privileged access’ (1991), Michael McKinsey asks us to consider the following three propositions, where ‘E’ says that some particular externalist condition for thinking that water is wet is met: (1) Oscar knows a priori that he is thinking that water is wet. (2) The proposition that Oscar is thinking that...