This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium in a model of price competition with fixed costs. It unveils an interesting and unexplored relationship between Bertrand competition and natural monopoly. That relationship points out that the non-subadditivity of the cost function at the output level corresponding to the oligopoly ...

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly* by Roman Inderst and Christian Wey This paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare takeover incentives in a differentiated Cournot and Bertrand o...

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute goods and product R&D. I find that R&D expenditure, prices and firms’ net profits are always higher under quantity competition than under price competition. Furthermore, output, consumer surplus and total welfare are higher in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium if either R&D spi...

Curves as a subject of differential geometry have been intriguing for researchers throughout mathematical history and so they have been one of the interesting research fields. Regular curves play a central role in the theory of curves in differential geometry. In the theory of curves, there are some special curves such as Bertrand curves, Mannheim curves, involute and evolute curves, and pedal ...

Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies constitute the two most prevalent models of firm competition. The analysis of Nash equilibria in each model reveals a unique prediction about the stable state of the system. Quite alarmingly, despite the similarities of the two models, their projections expose a stark dichotomy. Under the Cournot model, where firms compete by strategically managing their output ...

This study considers the strategic relations between emission tax and environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) in a Cournot–Bertrand comparison analyzes two different timings of games tax-then-ECSR (T game) an ECSR-then-tax (E game). We show that T game always yields higher than E irrespective competition modes, but lower ECSR under Cournot when marginal damage is high Bertrand comp...