We propose various models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called “The Lobby”) seeks to influence the voters’ preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters’ preferences are represented in terms of probabilities. In particular, we provide two evaluation criteria and three bribery methods to formally describe these models, and we consider the ...

This paper examines the issue of tax evasion by enterprises through underreporting activity. We develop a view of this phenomenon as an equilibrium of the game between a businessman and an imperfectly monitored supervising official, in which a businessman can hide part of his profit and offer bribe to official. We determine conditions under which such tax evasion and bribery become wide-spread ...

We propose various models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called “The Lobby”) seeks to influence the voters’ preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters’ preferences are represented in terms of probabilities. In particular, we provide two evaluation criteria and three bribery methods to formally describe these models, and we consider the ...

In this thesis we study computational aspects of different voting problems and cooperative games with hedonic preferences. For two well-studied voting systems, namely Bucklin and fallback voting, we present a detailed study of the computational complexity of common manipulative attacks on elections. We fully describe the classical worst-case complexity of manipulation, bribery, and swap bribery...

In computational social choice, the complexity of changing the outcome of elections via manipulation, bribery, and various control actions, such as adding or deleting candidates or voters, has been studied intensely. Endriss et al. [13, 14] initiated the complexity-theoretic study of problems related to judgment aggregation. We extend their results on manipulation to a whole class of judgment a...

We consider a multi-agent scenario where a collection of agents needs to select a common decision from a large set of decisions over which they express their preferences. This decision set has a combinatorial structure, that is, each decision is an element of the Cartesian product of the domains of some variables. Agents express their preferences over the decisions via soft constraints. We cons...

The Bitcoin cryptocurrency introduced a novel distributed consensus mechanism relying on economic incentives. While a coalition controlling a majority of computational power may undermine the system, for example by double-spending funds, it is often assumed it would be incentivized not to attack to protect its long-term stake in the health of the currency. We show how an attacker might purchase...

This paper develops a principal-agent model to explore the interaction of corruption, bribery, and political oversight of production. Under full information, an honest politician achieves the first best while a dishonest politician creates shortages and bribes. Under asymmetric information, an honest politician may create more shortages relative to a dishonest one, but the latter creates more b...

We show that a number of election-related problems with prices (such as, for example, bribery) are fixed-parameter tractable (in FPT) when parameterized by the number of candidates. For bribery, this resolves a nearly 10-year old family of open problems. Our results follow by a general technique that formulates voting problems as covering problems and extends the classic approach of using integ...