In this study the authors use 3 years of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) to evaluate alternative demographic, survey, and claims-based risk adjusters for Medicare capitation payment. The survey health-status models have three to four times the predictive power of the demographic models. The risk-adjustment model derived from claims diagnoses has 75-percent greater predictive powe...

The mode of payment creates powerful incentives affecting provider behavior and the efficiency, equity and quality outcomes of health finance reforms. This article examines provider incentives as well as administrative costs, and institutional conditions for successful implementation associated with provider payment alternatives. The alternatives considered are budget reforms, capitation, fee-f...

To determine the factors associated with primary care physician self-selection into different payment models, we used a panel of eight waves of administrative data for all primary care physicians who practiced in Ontario between 2003/2004 and 2010/2011. We used a mixed effects logistic regression model to estimate physicians' choice of three alternative payment models: fee for service, enhanced...

Pay for performance (P4P) incentives for physicians are generally designed as additional payments that can be paired with any existing payment mechanism such as a salary, fee-for-services and capitation. However, the link between the physician response to performance incentives and the existing payment mechanisms is still not well understood. In this article, we study this link using the recent...

Maximizing AV fistula creation, regular access monitoring, prompt outpatient interventions and minimizing catheter use are well-accepted approaches for vascular access management. Systemic barriers impede the application of these strategies. A misaligned reimbursement system coupled with educational deficits and a lack of accountability has contributed to the institutionalization of substandard...

A selfish routing game is a simple model of selfish behaviors in networks. It is called that Braess’s paradox occurs in the selfish routing game if an equilibrium flow achieved by players’ selfish behaviors is not the optimal minimum latency flow. In order to make the minimum latency flow a Nash equilibrium, a marginal cost tax has been proposed. Braess graphs have also been proposed to discuss...

BACKGROUND To determine whether education and financial incentives increased dentists' delivery of fluoride varnish and sealants to at risk children covered by capitation dental insurance in Washington state (U.S.). METHODS In 1999, 53 dental offices in Washington Dental Service's capitation dental plan were invited to participate in the study, and consenting offices were randomized to interv...

This paper analyzes and compares the incentive properties of some common payment mechanisms for GPs, namely fee for service (FFS), capitation and fundholding. It focuses on gatekeeping GPs and it specifically recognizes GPs heterogeneity in both ability and altruism. It also allows inappropriate care by GPs to lead to more serious illnesses. The results are as follows. Capitation is the payment...

While the implications of payment mechanisms for provider behaviour and cost have been amply explored in industrialized countries, there is little empirical evidence from developing countries. This study exploits the opportunities created by a pilot study of micro health insurance with capitation in Rwanda to address this issue. Using cross-sectional data collected in 52 health centres, the pap...