Many collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between competitors, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market share allocation. Such communication may facilitate collusion even if it is unverifiable cheap talk and underlying information becomes publicly available delay. The allow firms implement incentive-compatible reallocation mechanisms after unexp...

Este trabalho tem como objetivo avaliar as mudanças na estrutura produtiva chinesa impactaram os preços de bens industriais exportados pelo país entre 2001 e 2017. Para isto, considera-se o preço sendo uma variável explicativa da qualidade das exportações. Metodologicamente propõe-se calcular margens intensiva acordo com Hummels Klenow (2005) para grupos setoriais categorizados por tipos tecnol...

A new method of enforcing mutual exclusion among concurrent processes on uniprocessors running UNIX is presented in this paper. When a process attempts to obtain a lock, no race condition will occur unless the process is preempted. The central idea is that a process can avoid a race condition if preemption is made visible to the process when it is rescheduled. Two possible implementations of th...

As I read authoritative reports by well-known petroleum geologists on the Internet about the end of Cheap Oil, I became more and more engrossed about this greatest story never told. (In fact, the story has been told, but it has never reached the press headlines.) I wanted to know how it all turns out. It is surprising how much high quality, authoritative information can be obtained from a caref...

Several conceptual points are made concerning communication in games of asymmetric information. Equilibrium refinements of Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games that are based on the concept of a putative equilibrium, and which rely on the presence of a rich language with literal meanings, are discussed. Three nested criteria are proposed: strong announcement-proofness, announcement-proofness, and w...

When are comparative statements credible? We show that simple complementarity conditions ensure that an expert with private information about multiple issues can credibly rank the issues for a decision maker. By restricting the expert’s ability to exaggerate, multidimensional cheap talk of this form permits communicationwhen it would not be credible in a single dimension. The communication gain...

Can comparative statements be credible even when absolute statements are not? For instance, can a professor credibly rank different students for a prospective employer even if she has an incentive to exaggerate the merits of each student? Or can an analyst credibly rank different stocks even if the client would be dubious about a recommendation to buy any one of them? We examine such problems i...