This paper characterizes the optimal level of deposit insurance (DI) when bank runs are possible. In a wide variety of environments, the optimal level of DI only depends on three sufficient statistics: the sensitivity of the likelihood of bank failure with respect to the level of DI, the utility loss caused by bank failure (which is a function of the drop in depositors’ consumption) and the exp...

calculating total cast of bank resources procurement methods which include current -free loan deposit, saving interest-free loan deposit, regular and net short-term investment deposit, long-term investment deposit and surety bond cash deposit and presenting their optimal integration require precise scientific studies. hence, this study is an attempt to know which methods are the best optimal in...

Eight smokers were randomly assigned to a deposit contract ($50.00) or to a no-deposit group. Using a reversal design, participants could recoup their deposit (deposit group) or earn vouchers (no-deposit group) for smoking reductions and abstinence (breath carbon monoxide [CO] < or =4 parts per million) during treatment phases. Treatment was delivered via a novel Internet-based method to monito...

This paper studies the provision of deposit insurance along with liquidation decisions without commitment in an economy with heterogenous households. The analysis separates control of the balance sheet of a failed bank from the provision of deposit insurance. We study the factors that determine orderly liquidation and the effects of this policy on the prospect of bank runs. We also study the pr...

This paper undertakes a simple general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of deposit insurance programs, the way in which they are priced, and the way in which they fund revenue shortfalls. We show that the central issue in analyzing deposit insurance is how the government will make up any FDIC losses. Deposit insurance premia matter only in so far as they affect the level of implied FDIC...