This paper considers a general class of combinatorial auctions with ascending prices, which includes the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and core-selecting auctions. We analyze incentives in ascending combinatorial auctions under complete and perfect information. We show that in every ascending auction, the “Vickrey-target strategy” constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium with a restricted st...

Although combinatorial auctions have received a great deal of attention from the computer science community over the past decade, research in this domain has focused on settings in which a bidder only has preferences over the bundles of goods they themselves receive, and is indifferent about how other goods are allocated to other bidders. In general, however, bidders in combinatorial auctions w...

We extend the framework of mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions to include time constraints, present an expressive bidding language, and show how to solve the winner determination problem for such auctions using integer programming. Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions are auctions where bidders can offer combinations of transformations of goods rather than just simple goods. This model h...

Single-item auctions have many desirable properties. Mechanisms exist to ensure optimality, incentive compatibility and market-clearing prices. When multiple items are offered through individual auctions, a bidder wanting a bundle of items faces an exposure problem if the bidder places a high value on a combination of goods but a low value on strict subsets of the desired collection. To remedy ...

When combinatorial bidding is permitted in auctions, such as the proposed FCC auction #31, the resulting full valuations and winner-determination problem can be computationally challenging. We present a branch-and-price algorithm based on a set-packing formulation originally proposed by Dietrich and Forrest (2002). This formulation has a variable for every possible combination of winning bids f...

A combinatorial auction allows bidders to submit bids on bundles of objects and can be considered the pivotal example of a multiple object auctions. They also constitute a paradigmatic problem in algorithmic mechanism design. We provide an overview of both the computational complexity and strategic complexity inherent in the design of such auctions, and discuss how these challenges are addresse...

Although combinatorial auctions have received a great deal of attention from the computer science community over the past decade, research in this domain has focussed on settings in which a bidder only has preferences over the bundles of goods they themselves receive, and is indifferent about how other goods are allocated to other bidders. In general, however, bidders in combinatorial auctions ...

Much research has focused on the design of efficient combinatorial auctions. Recent gametheoreticalwork highlights that strategy-proof ascendingmechanisms for general valuations are impossible due to inherent free-rider problems in specific situations. We argue that these negative results are due to assumptions in Bayesian games which typically do not hold in online combinatorial auctions. Howe...