Henry Monaghan famously argued that much of constitutional interpretation takes the form of what he termed constitutional common law, a body of doctrines and rules that are constitutionally inspired but not constitutionally required and that can be altered or reversed by Congress. This Essay argues that a fair amount of ordinary administrative law qualifies as constitutional common law: Constit...

Today, the agenda includes transformation of civil society in era information revolution, impact technologies on development and ensuring constitutional human rights freedoms. The spread Internet, access to a global scale, simplification communications create conditions for strengthening social activity society, but do not ensure its inevitability. Information technology is just tool that can b...

Constitutional architects usually include in constitutional texts an unamendable clause known as constitutional entrenchment. A constitutional entrenchment serves different purposes such as, shielding and preserving high valued constitutional norms and distancing the state from past autocratic practices. The study of constitutional entrenchment has attracted great attention in recent years sinc...

Scholars have shown that written constitutions may be informally amended in various ways, for instance by judicial interpretation, statute, or executive action. But scholars have yet to fully appreciate that written constitutions may also be informally amended by desuetude. Informal amendment by constitutional desue-tude occurs when a constitutional provision loses its binding force upon politi...

this paper investigates the possibility of attending to iran’s constitutional shi’i jurisprudence as a perspective for approaching toward deliberative democracy. it claims there is an epistemological potentiality where it is possible to think of the theory of deliberative democracy from a specific islamic shi’i jurisprudential theory stated by mirza mohammad hossein na’ini (1890-1939) during th...

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................ 677 I. LOCHNER IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CANON......................................... 680 II. LOCHNER AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE .......................................... 696 III. LOCHNER AND CONSTITUTIONAL ETHOS ............................................. 706 IV. LOCHNER AND CONSTITUTIO...