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We analyze the contracting structure in a moral hazard setting with several agents where output is produced jointly and is the only contractible variable. Since the salary of each agent is a function of all agents efforts, a positive externality arises between them. This externality is not internalised by a centralised structure where the principal contracts directly with each agent. Instead, w...

The Poisson boundary for measures with a nite rst moment on polycyclic groups is shown to coincide with the corresponding contracting nilpotent Lie group. The proof is based on using a geometric \strip criterion" of boundary maximality due to the author and a simple estimate of the \neutral component" of the random walk.

Thales (www.thalesgroup.com), established in France more than a century ago, is a leading international group, addressing defense, aerospace, and security markets worldwide. Thales’ expertise in its core markets spans the entire value chain, providing all the capabilities its customers require, from equipment and systems to comprehensive support services, and including prime contracting on larg...

Considering the promises and perils of contracting for use artificial intelligence tools data.

We consider multiagent multifirm contracting when agents benchmark their wages to those of peers, using weights that vary within and across firms. When a single principal commits public contract, optimal contracts hedge relative wage risk without sacrificing efficiency. But compensation benchmarking undoes performance benchmarking, causing load positively on peer output, asymmetries in effects ...