We compare the number of active firms, i.e. the number of firms producing a positive quantity, in equilibrium across four different models of oligopoly: Cournot and Bertrand with homogeneous or differentiated goods. We concentrate on the linear demand structure with constant marginal but asymmetric costs. (With symmetric costs, the results trivialize to all firms active or all firms inactive.) ...

We consider a Cournot oligopoly model where multiple suppliers (oligopolists) compete by choosing quantities. We compare the aggregate profit achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, which would be obtained if the suppliers were to collude. We establish a lower bound on the profit of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter derived from the inverse demand function and...

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper investigates a manufacturer's retail outsourcing strategies under different competition modes with economies of scale. We focus on the effects market modes, scale and competitor's behavior decisions, then we develop four game models three modes. Firstly, find channel structure where both manufacturers choose cannot be an equilibrium Cournot competit...

In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that, as the number of firms increases, the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to (i) decreasing industry price and increasing or decreasing per-firm output; and (ii) increasing industry price (and decreasing per firm output.) In both cas...

A large body of literature has accumulated which examines how the optimal solution of an agent maximizing the expectation of a real-valued function, depending on a random parameter p and the agent's behavior x, reacts to perturbations in the first and second moments of p. Here, by an approximation valid for small uncertainty, we allow many agents and consider their behavior in a Cournot-Nash eq...

We study the merger paradox, a relative of Harsanyi’s bargaining paradox, in an experiment. We examine bilateral mergers in experimental Cournot markets with initially three or four firms. Standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium predicts total outputs well. However, merged firms produce significantly more output than their competitors. As a result, mergers are not unprofitable. By analysing control t...

Recent literature shows that learning in oligopoly games might in the long run result in the Cournot or in the Walras equilibrium. Which outcome is achieved seems to depend on the underlying learning dynamics. This paper analyzes the forces behind the learning mechanisms determining the long run outcome. Apart from the fact that there is a difference between social and individual learning, the ...

We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time. The peculiarity of the is that players are characterized by time-evolving types, and so reasonably their actions should not anticipate future values types. When interactions between mean field kind, we relate Nash equilibria for such games to an asymptotic notion Cournot--Nash equilibria. Inspired works Blanchet Carlier static situat...

The paper considers mechanisms for organizing free trade in the electricity market that are based on submitting bids of energy consumers and producers to the market operator. The authors discuss and compare possible strategies of generator behavior that lead to different equilibrium situations and correspond to Cournot model and the models of supply function equilibria, and a perfectly competit...