Abst rac t -Dynamic rent-seeking games with nonlinear cost functions are analyzed. The local asymptotic stability of the solution is first examined. We show that in the absence of a dominant agent, all eigenvalues of the Jacobian are real. Conditions are given for the local asymptotic stability as well as for the local instability of the equilibrium. In the presence of a dominant agent, complex...

For a tournament $H$ with $h$ vertices, its typical density is $h!2^{-\binom{h}{2}}/aut(H)$, i.e. this the expected of in random tournament. A family ${\mathcal F}$ $h$-vertex tournaments {\em dominant} if for all sufficiently large $n$, there exists an $n$-vertex $G$ such that each element larger than by constant factor. Characterizing dominant families challenging already small $h$. Here we c...

This paper examines an evolutionary model in which the primary source of ``noise'' that moves the model between equilibria is not arbitrarily improbable mutations but mistakes in learning. We model strategy selection as a birth death process, allowing us to find a simple, closed-form solution for the stationary distribution. We examine equilibrium selection by considering the limiting case as t...

Dominant-strategy truthfulness is traditionally considered the best possible solution concept in mechanism design, as it enables one to predict with confidence which strategies independent players will actually choose. Yet, as with any other form of equilibrium, it too can be extremely vulnerable to collusion. The problem of collusion is particularly evident for unrestricted combinatorial aucti...