The general framework of this volume is that of game theory, with multiple participants (“players”) who interact repeatedly over time. The players may be people, corporations, nations, computers—even genes. See the Handbook of Game Theory (Aumann and Hart 1994, 2002, 2004; Young and Zamir 2012). Many of the standard concepts of game theory are static by their very nature. This is certainly true...

We analyze sunspot-equilibrium prices in nonconvex economies with perfect markets and a continuous sunspot variable. Our primary result is that every sunspot equilibrium allocation can be supported by prices that, when adjusted for probabilities, are constant across states. This result extends to the case of a finite number of equally probable states under weak nonsatiation conditions, but does...

The use of equilibrium models in economics springs from the desire for parsimonious models of economic phenomena that take human reasoning into account. This approach has been the cornerstone of modern economic theory. We explain why this is so, extolling the virtues of equilibrium theory; then we present a critique and describe why this approach is inherently limited, and why economics needs t...

Policies to promote human capital formation have been advocated as a remedy for reducing the economy-wide problem of rising wage inequality. These policies are national in character and are designed to substantially alter the proportion of the work-force that is skilled. Yet the methods used to evaluate these policies are partial equilibrium in nature and do not take account of the consequences...

Equilibrium existence results are presented for competitive markets with externalities in price and consumption and a measure space of agents. These unify and extend [Balder, E.J., 2003. Existence of competitive equilibria in economies with a measure space of consumers and consumption externalities. Preprint, in press, electronically available at http://www.math.uu.nl/publications/ preprints/12...

A well-known shortcoming of rational voter models is that the equilibrium probability that an individual votes converges to zero as the population of citizens tends to infinity. We show that this does not – as is often suggested – imply that equilibrium voter turnout is insignificant in the limit. We characterize limiting equilibrium turnout and show that it may actually be arbitrarily large. I...

in this paper, we prove some coupled coincidence point theorems for mappings with the mixedmonotone property and obtain the uniqueness of this coincidence point. then we providing useful examples in nash equilibrium.

In the 1970s, experimental economics split from social psychology by embracing rational choice and equilibrium methods. Behavioral economics has recently narrowed the divide, to the dismay of some. The present paper argues that evolutionary dynamics provides a framework which unifies the best features of social psychology with equilibrium and rational choice. Ongoing research in cheating in mar...

Political science and economic science … make use of the same language, the same mode of abstraction, the same instruments of thought and the same method of reasoning (Black 1998, p. 354). Economics imperialism refers to the application of (mainstream) economic methods to the study of phenomena outside the traditional domain of economics. Uskali Mäki (forthcoming) has recently presented a typol...

Kakutani’s fixed point theorem has many applications in economics and game theory. One of its most well-known applications is in John Nash’s paper [8], where the theorem is used to prove the existence of an equilibrium strategy in n-person games. Sperner’s lemma, on the other hand, is a combinatorial result concerning the labelling of the vertices of simplices and their triangulations. It is kn...