This paper describes Scantegrity, an electronic voting system developed by Chaum et al. (2008b), and it analyses Scantegrity’s ability to satisfy the goals of privacy and verifiability. The paper describes a programmatic attack on Scantegrity and presents findings in the form of program output for a corrupted hypothetical election. The attack takes advantage of the inherent vulnerability of ele...

This project was motivated by the growing apprehension among Irish citizens over the electronic voting system being introduced here. The aims of the project were three: to discover what would be required of an electronic voting system to make it a suitable replacement for the existing paper-ballot system; to examine whether the Nedap/Powervote system meets those requirements; to begin the proce...

This paper proposes hybrid voting systems as a solution for the vote buying and voter coercion problem of electronic voting systems. The key idea is to allow voters to revoke and overrule their electronic votes at the polling station. We analyze the potential and pitfalls of such revocation procedures and give concrete recommendations on how to build a hybrid system offering coercion-resistance...

Veri able electronic voting has been extensively researched for over twenty years, but few protocols have achieved real-life deployment. A key impediment, we argue, is caused by the existing protocols' universal reliance on the probity of the tallying authorities. This might seem surprising to many people as dependence on tallying authorities has been a de facto standard in the eld. However, th...

Punchscan is a unique hybrid paper/electronic voting system concept. As a receipt-based system, Punchscan provides high voter privacy and election integrity, yet it does not rely on the complex and fragile electronic voting machines found in many current implementations. In this paper, we define the Punchscan system and voting protocol, including the people, objects and events involved and the ...

We propose an electronic voting machine architecture in which the voting user interface is prerendered and published before election day. The prerendered user interface is a verifiable artifact — an electronic sample ballot — enabling public participation in the review, verification, usability testing, and accessibility testing of the ballot. Preparing the user interface outside of the voting m...

As the world watched the electoral drama unfold in Florida at the end of 2000, people started wondering, “Wouldn’t all our problems be solved if they just used Internet Voting?”. People all over the world soon started taking a hard look at their voting equipment and procedures, and trying to figure out how to improve them [1]. There is a strong inclination towards moving to Remote Internet Voti...

Voting is one of the primary foundations of democracy. Existing voting legislation and non-electronic voting systems have been developed over the years in a way that ensures that the principles required for democratic elections and referendums are met. The significance of these issues is clearly manifested by the volume of debate, which lately has begun on them as well as by the increased numbe...

We examine the effects of a type of electoral fraud easily perpetrated by someone with access to the system software for a direct-recording electronic voting system. The hypothetical attacker modifies the software to arbitrarily change a small number of votes on each voting machine. We determine the effect of this manipulation on the electoral college results of the 2000 United States President...

Unlike the other papers in this series, this one does not attempt to provide a consensus view of the experts on international best practices. Electronic voting is still a relatively young technology, and no consensus has yet emerged. Instead, this paper offers suggestions to international donors about how they should evaluate and respond to requests for help implementing electronic voting syste...