We introduce a new method of varying risk that bidders face in first-price and second-price private value auctions. We find that decreasing bidders’ risk in first-price auction reduces the degree of overbidding relative to the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium prediction. This finding is consistent with the risk-aversion explanation of overbidding. Furthermore, we apply the method to secon...

Six hens pecked a key (Experiment 1) or pushed a door (Experiment 2) to obtain food reinforcement. In both experiments and as an analogue of price changes, the response requirements were varied in two ways: by increasing the number of responses required and by increasing the required force of each response. The two price manipulations (response number and response force) had different effects o...

Abstract Assume that customers are price sensitive, changes in the price of perishable products will bring changes in demand, and business can adjust the perishable products' price to influence the market demand, a perishable products multi-stage pricing model considering cancelations and no-shows is proposed, and the optimal pricing, the optimal expected revenue with the products' initial quan...

This paper endogenizes bidders’ beliefs about their competition in a symmetric first-price auction with independent private values, by allowing bidders to decide whether to participate publicly or secretly. When public participation is more costly, bidders only participate secretly in the unique equilibrium. By contrast, when secret participation is slightly more costly, all symmetric equilibri...

This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders’ types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue than second-pric...

In English auctions, introducing a buy price, i.e., the seller’s maximum price bid at which any bidder at any time can immediately win the auction, allows the seller to gain higher expected utility than that in a traditional auction when either the seller or the buyers are risk-averse. If the seller sets the buy price high enough, the buyprice English auction is efficient and guarantees the hig...

We see that the price of an european call option in a stochastic volatility framework can be decomposed in the sum of four terms, which identify the main features of the market that affect to option prices: the expected future volatility, the correlation between the volatility and the noise driving the stock prices, the market price of volatility risk and the difference of the expected future v...

We use perturbation analysis to obtain explicit approximations of the equilibrium bids in asymmetric first-price auctions with n bidders, in which bidders’ valuations are independently drawn from different distribution functions. Several applications are presented: explicit approximations of the seller’s expected revenue, the maximal bid, the optimal reserve price, inefficiency, and a consequen...

One of the tenets of equilibrium asset pricing models is that expected return of an asset is positively related to its risk (price variability of the asset). In other words, it is expected that assets with higher expected returns are also the ones with higher risk, or assets with lower risk are the ones with lower expected returns. The logic behind this idea is actually is simple and intuitive:...

In an intertemporal setting in which individual uncertainty is resolved over time, advancepurchase discounts can serve to price discriminate between consumers with different expected valuations for the product. Consumers with a high expected valuation purchase the product before learning their actual valuation at the offered advance-purchase discount; consumers with a low expected valuation wil...