We reexamine the characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms introduced in Archer & Tardos (2001). argue that claimed uniqueness result, called 'Myerson's Lemma' was not well established. provide an elementary proof unifies presentation for two classes allocation functions used literature and show general case is a consequence little known result from theory real fu...

This paper considers an interdependent-value robust mechanism design problem, where the principal has little knowledge about agent’s belief. Although ex post incentive-compatible (EPIC) mechanisms can implement allocations without any belief, we show that, under a certain condition (order-reversing interdependence), there exists non-EPIC that achieves strictly higher expected revenue than EPIC ...

We study the ex ante incentive compatible core, and provide conditions under which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty when agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002a, Econometrica, 70, 2421–2453).  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C71; D51; D82

We show that the the unit demand auction introduced by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor [5] is incentive compatible even when bidders have budget constraints. Furthermore we show that myopic bidding is an ex post equilibrium. Finally, we show that any other incentive compatible which always outputs a competitive equilibrium (envy free) must coincide with the DGS auction.

In this paper we introduce a game-theoretic model for reward functions within a single Bitcoin mining pool. Our model consists only of an unordered history of reported shares and gives participating miners the strategy choices of either reporting or delaying when they discover a share or full solution. We defined a precise condition for incentive compatibility to ensure miners strategy choices ...

In flexible labour markets the individual employment prospects over the life cycle increasingly depend on the readiness to be mobile and to undertake occupational changes as well as life-long learning. However, continuous adaptation to changing demands on the labour market holds the risk of discontinuities in employment biographies which can have a negative impact on old-age incomes. From a soc...

This paper revisits Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) classic analysis of mechanism design for bilateral trading, replacing equilibrium with a level-k model strategic thinking focusing on direct mechanisms. The revelation principle fails models, so restricting attention to mechanisms imposing incentive-compatibility are not without loss generality. If, however, only direct, level-k-incentive-c...